A simulation of an evolving collection of players of the iterated <a href=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma>prisoner's dilemma.</a>
When people co-operate, things usually turn out well. If no-one co-operates, then everyone usually suffers. So the game plan is obvious, right?
Wrong! If everyone else is co-operating, then some clever fellow will come along and take advantage. So now the game plan is obvious, refuse to co-operate and take advantage of everyone who is naively co-operating.
Stupid! This is so obvious that no-one will co-operate, will they? And, yes, everyone will suffer.
This is clever?
This is a famous dilemma, with all sorts of significant analogies in the real world from Mutually Assured Destruction to the Tragedy of the Commons to the evolution of ethics in a godless universe.
There is a very simple solution, though it only becomes perfectly obvious by using mathematical simulation.
<h3>The Fossil Repository</h3>
The fossil repository is a single file containing the complete history
of the code source along with the documentation and tickets.
Fossil software configuration management provides self-hosting source control, documentation and ticketing all in one executable file obtained from <a href = http://www.fossil-scm.org> here </a>
Clone the dilemma fossil repository with the command
fossil clone http://open:email@example.com/cgi-bin/dilemma.cgi dilemma.fossil
Extract the source code for the latest version
fossil open dilemma.fossil
<h3>Zip File of v1.0 source code</h3>
A zip file containing just the source code for v1.0.0 can dowloaded from <a href=http://184.108.40.206/cgi-bin/dilemma.cgi/zip/Dilemma-08fa7a177c.zip?uuid=08fa7a177cd8685e33a9f6a7764762bbdbe4bc5f> here </a>
<h2> Other Code</h2>
[http://220.127.116.11 | Other] open source code by James Bremner, [http://ravenspoint.com | Raven's Point Consulting ]